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Traditional accounts in both the international law and international relations literature largely 
assume that great powers like the United States enter into international legal commitments in order to 
resolve global cooperative problems or to advance objective state interests.  Contrary to these accounts, 
this Article suggests that an incumbent regime (or partisan elites within the regime) may often seek to 
use international legal commitments to overcome domestic obstacles to their narrow policy and 
electoral objectives.  In this picture, an incumbent regime may deploy international law to expand the 
geographical scope of political conflict across borders in order to isolate the domestic political 
opposition and increase the influence of foreign groups or governments sympathetic to the regime’s 
objectives.  The political opposition may in turn seek to exploit the existence of a fragmented system of 
domestic institutions to thwart both the adoption and enforcement of any international law that 
strengthens the ruling regime and weakens its own position.  Finally, this Article sketches a framework 
for predicting when distributive international legal commitments are likely to be sustainable across 
electoral cycles and when they are not.  More specifically, the framework suggests that an 
international legal commitment is likely to be electorally sustainable when the veil of ignorance 
underlying the commitment is sufficiently thick; in other words, an international commitment entered 
into by a partisan regime has more staying power if it produces policy outcomes that are favored by 
some salient groups in the political opposition.  The Article uses examples from the United States 
experience with human rights and international trade to illustrate how partisan dynamics between 




International law binds nation-states, but it is usually politicians who make the crucial 
decision whether to adopt or enforce international legal commitments.  Thus, contrary to 
conventional wisdom, the logic and efficacy of international law should not be judged exclusively 
by the elevated yardstick of global cooperation or objective state interest.1  Rather, support and 
                                                 
*  Professor of Law, Northwestern University Law School.    For helpful commentary at an earlier stage of this 
project I am grateful to William Howell and other participants at Northwestern Law School’s Searle Center Faculty 
Conference on Law and Political Science. I would also like to thank Jonell Goco for his excellent research assistance.  
1 For instance, a core claim of the liberal institutionalist school of thought in international relations is that 
international agreements provide mechanisms for achieving mutually beneficial cooperation among nation-states. See 
ROBERT O KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984).   
This institutionalist approach has been quite influential in international law scholarship attempting to explain shy 
states bind themselves to international agreements.  See Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A 
Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and 




opposition to international law should also be judged by another compelling yardstick: the desire 
of politicians to retain power and advance their partisan policy preferences.  At some level, both 
international agreements and customary international law may require politicians to make 
concessions that restructure the domestic institutional or policy landscape.  Sometimes, but not 
always, such concessions may alter the political leverage of one domestic group in favor of another.  
Since partisan prospects for staying in power and advancing policy preferences may be affected by 
international legal commitments, we may anticipate that support for international law will vary 
across both parties and electoral cycles.   
  
Unfortunately, we still know very little about when or how domestic partisan groups make 
the implementation and enforcement of international law more likely.  This problem is especially 
pronounced in our analysis of democratic regimes.  Though there is now a growing academic 
consensus that democratic regimes are more likely than their non-democratic counterparts to 
engage in international cooperation,2 there is little analysis of whether the propensity toward 
embracing international law among such democracies varies across right-leaning and left-leaning 
governments.  To be sure, there is a rich social science literature that explores how interest groups 
influence international policy by lobbying political officials, but this literature does not usually 
analyze how this interest group dynamic interacts with domestic partisan politics.3  Moreover, 
much of the debate usually focuses on the preferences of domestic interest groups for specific 
policy outcomes rather than efforts to promote a political party’s ideological or electoral fortunes.  
Even when the role of parties in framing international legal issues is acknowledged, it is usually 
treated as an exception to the conventional wisdom that politics “stop at the water’s edge.”4   
 
This Essay advances a different perspective: that political parties—or partisan elites—will often 
embrace international legal commitments as a vehicle to overcome domestic structural obstacles to 
their policy and electoral objectives.  In this picture, an incumbent regime may strategically use 
international law to extend the scope of partisan conflict across borders in order to isolate the 
domestic political opposition and increase the influence of foreign groups or states that may be 
more sympathetic to the regime’s political objectives.  Put differently, political parties will often try 
to extend or shrink the scope of partisan conflict to venues in which they are likely to have an 
advantage over the political opposition.   Alternatively, an incumbent regime may also support 
international legal commitments that it knows are likely to provoke intra-coalitional conflict within 
the political opposition.  But just as partisan incumbents may use international law to advance 
their domestic partisan objectives, the political opposition may exploit domestic institutions to 
thwart international legal commitments that strengthen the ruling regime and weaken its own 
                                                                                                                                                             
Economic Analysis of International Law, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1999); Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of 
International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823 (2002) ; JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW  (2008). 
2 See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, et al, An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace, 93 AM. POL. SC. 
REV. 791 (1999); Edward D Mansfield et al, Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade 
Agreements, 56 INT’L ORG. 477 (2002); Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs. 12 PHILOSOPHY 
AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 205 (1983). 
3 See discussion in text at infra note __. 
4 See Joanne Gowa, Politics at the Water’s Edge: Parties, Voters, and the Use of Force, 52 INT’L ORG. 307 (1998) 




position.   Thus, rather than serve as a structure of mutually beneficial cooperation, international 
law may often devolve into a zero-sum dynamic that simply reflects an extension of domestic political conflict 
by other means.  
 
This perspective assumes that parties build reputations for addressing certain issues better than 
others and may seek to use international legal commitments to lock in those issues against the 
vagaries of domestic politics.  In other words, partisan officials may attempt to use international 
commitments to narrow the scope of future policy to their advantage, and thus weaken the ability 
of a future hostile regime to pursue its preferred policy objectives.  For instance, a right-leaning 
government may support an international trade agreement that reduces tariff barriers not only 
because of policy preferences, but also because such an agreement is likely to undercut the ability 
of a future left-leaning government to reward its loyal trade union constituencies.    Conversely, 
since governments of the left draw their base of support from labor and minority groups, such 
governments may be more open to negotiating and ratifying human rights agreements because 
these agreements are likely to reinforce the power of their loyal constituencies and weaken the 
power of right-leaning domestic forces opposed to progressive social and economic reform.     
 
By highlighting the fragmented and issue-specific context in which partisan politicians 
strategically use international law, this Essay challenges the commonly held intuition that parties of 
the left—or left-leaning elites—will tend to favor more international commitments and that parties 
of the right will tend to favor less.5  On the contrary, the politicians who accept or oppose 
international legal constraints on their authority come from all sides of the political spectrum, and 
they often do so because of the perceived political threats or opportunities arising from such 
constraints.  And although international legal commitments are often framed as institutional 
arrangements rather than as prescribed policy outcomes, political parties tend to rank these 
commitments based upon their expectations regarding future policy outcomes.  Such expectations 
may depend on partisan beliefs regarding the likely preferences of other states that are party to the 
international commitment (or the elites within those states) as well as the preferences of actors 
who will ultimately have the authority to enforce or interpret such commitments. 
 
Nevertheless, a puzzle still remains.  If an incumbent government signs an international 
commitment that advances its partisan objectives, how can it be sure that the political opposition 
will honor such a commitment once it eventually comes into power?  Put differently, are 
international commitments that run afoul of the partisan preferences of a successor regime 
electorally sustainable?  The short answer is that they are often not; indeed, international 
                                                 
5 DONALD H LUMSDAINE, MORAL VISION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: THE FOREIGN AID REGIME 1949-
1989  156-57(1993 (describing preference for left-leaning groups for foreign aid and opposition by right leaning 
groups);  see also Andrew Moravscik, Conservative Idealism and International Institutions, 1 CHI J INT’L L 291 (2000). 
Within the scholarly confines of the legal academy, the growing division between proponents of a more robust 
international legal framework and skeptics is usually framed in philosophical and not partisan terms.  See, e.g., Jose 
Alvarez, Contemporary International Law: An ‘Empire of Law’ or the Law of Empire, 24 AMER. U. L REV. 811, 812 (2009) 
(“Today's legal academy, particularly in the United States, reflects a divide between traditional defenders of 
international legalism and revisionist upstarts who question the efficacy, or at the very least the democratic legitimacy, 





commitments enacted by one partisan coalition are often subsequently sabotaged or undermined 
by hostile successor governments.6  But does this mean that international agreements that yield 
significant distributive partisan consequences are invariably doomed to a short political shelf-life?  
Not necessarily.  The logic of partisan entrenchment suggests that the governments that enact 
partisan-friendly institutional arrangements will attempt to take measures that reduce the chance 
of defection by their successors.  One such measure, which has been discussed extensively in the 
social science literature on domestic policy entrenchment, relies on creating political feedback 
mechanisms that empower a broader coalition of interest groups and powerful elites, who then 
become vested in protecting the newly-created institutional arrangement.7   
 
But while such reinforcing feedback mechanisms are undoubtedly important in the 
international context, they are hardly sufficient.  Since international legal commitments are often 
enacted and implemented in institutional environments that are fragile and highly contested, they 
are particularly vulnerable to reversal by successor regimes that are hurt by such commitments even 
when such commitments may also benefit a broad coalition of international and domestic 
interests.  More importantly, if a successor government seeks to subvert an unfavorable 
international legal commitment, it does not necessarily have to exit the commitment formally; it 
may simply refuse to implement the provisions rigorously.  Thus, creating barriers to exit an 
international commitment are not enough to guarantee its future efficacy.   
 
On the contrary, for a distributive international legal commitment to be sustainable across 
multiple electoral periods, it usually has to generate policy outcomes that benefit some politically 
salient members of the non-enacting coalition.  Thus, insofar as a forward-looking incumbent 
government wants to increase the durability of an international commitment that advances its 
partisan objectives, it has an incentive to include provisions in the commitment that provide side 
payments to some members of the political opposition, even if such benefits would not be enough 
to encourage the opposition to seek to adopt the commitment on its own.  Such defection-
proofing measures, which entail bundling together a diffuse range of issues in a specific 
international commitment, ensure that the non-enacting coalition is not likely to view the 
commitment purely as an arrangement that confers one-sided benefits on its political adversaries 
since all political actors must take the good along with the bad.   
 
 Some caveats are in order.  This Essay is not claiming that domestic support or opposition to 
international law in the United States is motivated entirely (or even mostly) by redistributive 
partisan objectives.  Indeed, domestic groups—including partisan elites—may oppose or support an 
international agreement or a customary international law norm because of principled policy 
                                                 
6 See discussion in text at infra notes ___ 
7  See Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment (March 24, 
2010), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1577749; Paul Pierson, Increasing returns, path dependence, and the 
study of politics, AM. POL. SC REV. 251 (2000).  For a discussion of how the psychological effect of political endowment 
to interest groups also helps entrenchment, see Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 




preferences largely detached from partisan considerations.8  Nor is this Essay claiming that all 
international agreements or norms of customary international law have redistributive or zero-sum 
consequences in which certain domestic groups win and others lose.9   This Essay simply focuses 
on instrumental partisan motivations in the context of international legal commitments that have 
distributive consequences because such motivations have been largely ignored or sidelined in the 
literature. 
 
This Essay proceeds as follows.  Part I critically evaluates the extant literature on the domestic 
sources of international law preferences.  Part II proposes a theoretical framework for 
understanding partisan support and opposition to international law.  Contrary to conventional 
wisdom, this Part suggests that international commitments and institutions do not always simply 
operate as structures for achieving global cooperative outcomes, but sometimes operate as 
structures that enable competing partisan groups to advance their preferred policy and electoral 
objectives.   This Part also explores the calculus of competing partisan groups and identifies the 
domestic institutional conditions that influence when they are likely to support or oppose 
international law.   
 
Part III uses two case studies from contemporary American history—the controversy 
surrounding the efforts to ratify human rights treaties in the 1950s and the 1993 NAFTA 
agreement—to shed some light on how distributive partisan politics can help spawn and limit the 
efficacy and scope of international law.  In the first case, strong opposition by Republicans and 
conservative Southern Democrats helped doom the ratification of human rights agreements 
favored by President Truman, a Democrat, and other progressives in the early years after the 
creation of the United Nations.  These draft human rights treaties failed in part because their 
progressive Democratic supporters did not have much leeway to structure these covenants in a way 
that would co-opt Republicans and Southern Democratic opposition through side payments.  Put 
differently, the veil of ignorance behind these early UN human rights treaties was sufficiently thin 
that key Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats realized that they would become 
unambiguous losers if such human rights agreements were ratified and became domestically 
binding in the United States.  By contrast, opposition by Democratic labor constituencies to the 
adoption of NAFTA in 1993 was partly muted not only through the inclusion of side agreements 
that benefited other Democratic constituencies, but also by the growing pro-business wing of the 
party.  The Republicans, on the other hand, tried to exploit the intra-partisan conflict within the 
Democratic Party over NAFTA for electoral advantage.  
 
I. Literature Overview 
 
                                                 
8 For instance, they may be concerned about enhancing democratic accountability, safeguarding against the 
centralization of governmental authority, resolving global cooperative or coordination dilemmas, or increasing global 
economic welfare.  
9 As observed in part II, infra, some international agreements or norms of customary international law may 
create mutual gains that make all domestic groups better off.  Or more plausibly, certain international legal agreements 
may help some and hurt other but nonetheless expand the size of the pie.  In such cases, the winners may be able to 




Domestic-level explanations of why states enter into international legal commitments can be 
broken down loosely into three categories: state centered, society centered, or state-society relations 
approaches.10    One prominent variant of the state-centered approach, liberal institutionalism, 
assumes that states enter into international agreements in order to resolve cooperation and 
coordination dilemmas inherent in a system of international anarchy.11  More generally, this 
approach assumes that international organizations and treaty regimes represent structures of 
cooperation in which all participants realize mutual gains.  And while states play a key role in this 
framework, they are often simply depicted as surrogates for societal preferences.12  However, a new 
generation of political science research has called into question some of the basic assumptions of 
the liberal institutionalist approach.  First, certain scholars have questioned the notion that 
multilateral agreements and international institutions tend to represent structures of cooperation 
that benefit all participants rather than structures of power.  For instance, Lloyd Gruber has 
argued that certain states may join international regimes or institutions even when they expect to 
be worse off because certain powerful countries have sufficient “go alone” power that they can alter 
the status quo for less powerful states.13    In this picture, once powerful states decide to band 
together to form a new institutional regime, such as an international trade organization, other less 
powerful states that oppose such a regime might be faced with a fait accomplit.   These less powerful 
states then face a choice between what they might view as an unfavorable option (acceding 
voluntarily to the new regime) and an even worse alternative (facing the costs of being excluded).14    
Second, and more broadly, scholars have also criticized the paradigm’s failure to integrate 
sufficiently the role of domestic distributive politics into the analysis of state motivation at the 
international level.15  Here, the argument is not that analyzing states as rational unitary actors is 
fundamentally defective, but that disaggregating the state further into its societal components is 
sometimes necessary when international legal commitments have domestic distributive 
implications.16  
  
                                                 
10 See Andrew Moravcsik, Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Levels of International Bargaining, in 
DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY (PETER B EVANS ET AL. ED., 1993) 5-6.  Another level of analysis, which is not discussed 
here, are international explanations which treat states as unitary actors responding to external forces and incentives.   
See id.   This paper brackets any discussion of such international explanations, not because they are irrelevant, but 
because the focus of this paper is on exploring the domestic sources of state preferences in the international arena.   
11 See Keohane, supra note 1; see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, Liberal International Relations Theory and 
International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 717, 731 (1995). 
12 Slaughter, Liberal International Relations, supra note __, at 727, 728 (arguing that state behavior is 
determined “not by the international balance of power ... but by the relationship between ... social actors and the 
governments representing their interests, in varying degrees of completeness”). 
13 See LLOYD GRUBER, RULING THE WORLD:  POWER POLITICS AND THE RISE OF SUPRANATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS (2000).  
14 See id. at 9-10. 
15 See Gruber, supra note __ at 9.   For a summary of the different approaches to international law as well as 
criticisms of each approach, see John G. Ikenberry et al, Introduction: Approaches to Explaining American Foreign Policy, 42 
INT’L ORG. 1 (1988); see also Rachel Brewster, The Domestic Origins of International Agreements, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 501, 
512-13 (2004); 
16 For instance, some commentators have attempted to explain international behavior by integrating both 
domestic and international factors.  See Nitsan Chorev, A fluid divide: Domestic and international factors in US trade policy 




Moving beyond the emphasis on state preferences, a new wave of society–based explanations 
attempts to understand the evolution of legal norms through the forces that shape the identities 
and preferences of dominant elites within each state.17  In these so-called constructivist or 
sociological accounts, the preferences of such elites regarding specific international legal 
commitments are rarely fixed, but evolve based on the activities of transnational activists or norm 
entrepreneurs who use persuasion to secure acceptance of specific norms and legal commitments.  
Thus, rather than take the preferences of individual decision-makers as given, this approach argues 
that such decision-makers will be particularly susceptible to emulating behavioral patterns in others 
that seem modern or sophisticated.    
    
 While constructivism helps illuminate why certain domestic actors favor the spread of 
international laws or norms, it is nonetheless incomplete.  First, the constructivist account does 
not sufficiently appreciate the possibility that politicians who are primarily motivated by electoral 
ambitions or narrow policy objectives may cloak their preferred international legal commitments 
in the high-minded language of norm diffusion or socialization.18  Second, constructivists neglect 
the possibility that partisan ideological considerations may influence the ability of norm 
entrepreneurs to persuade;19 in other words, certain normative ideals—such as social and labor 
rights—may find more fertile ground for reception among certain domestic partisan groups and not 
others.  And even when particular states agree to implement human rights ideals in the abstract, it 
does not necessarily translate to any common understanding by competing partisan groups about 
what such ideals may mean in practice.  This latter concern is especially pronounced in 
circumstances where motivated reasoning precludes partisans from even agreeing upon the 
existence of politically relevant events. .20  
                                                 
17 See Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic 
Practices in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 3 (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How 
to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004); Harold Hongju Koh, Why 
Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 Yale L.J. 2599 (1997);  see also  Roger P. Alford, The Nobel Effect: Nobel Peace 
Prize Laureates as International Norm Entrepreneurs, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 61 (2008).  For a good discussion of norm diffusion 
in an international legal context, see Katerina Linos, How Can International Organizations Shape National Welfare States?, 
40 COMPARATIVE LEG. STUD. 547 (2007). 
18 For instance, as Ian Hurd has shown in his treatment of the UN sanctions regime against Libya, states can 
manipulate the legitimacy and norms associated with international institutions to their strategic advantage.  See Ian 
Hurd, The Strategic Use of Liberal Internationalism:  Libya and the UN Sanctions, 1992-2003, 59 INT’L ORG. 495, 497 
(2003).   More recently, Jelena Subotic has also argued that warring ethnic factions in the former Yugoslavia were likely 
to invoke the rhetoric of international norms selectively in circumstances where it suited their ambitions to obtain 
power.  See Jelena Subotic, Hijacked Justice: Domestic Appropriation of International Norms, Human Rights & Human 
Welfare Working Papers series, available at www.du.edu/gsis/hrhw/working/2005/28-subotic-2005.pdf. 
19 For instance, the constructivist framework does not necessarily account for why there would be variation in 
the internalization of international legal norms among different elite groups across and within democratic states.  
Indeed, the evidence of how international law norms influence political elites is decidedly mixed with certain studies 
showing some effect and others showing no effect at all. Cf Liesbet Hooghe, Several Roads Lead to International Norms, 
but Few via International Socialization, 59 INT’L ORG. 861 (2005) (finding no effect) with Risse and Sikkink, supra note 
__, at 3-4 (finding a significant effect).   
20 As a growing amount of literature in social psychology and cognition theory suggests, partisanship often 
plays a pervasive role in how individuals update their beliefs even when subject to shared experiences of political 





 A second society-based account emphasizes the role domestic interest groups play in 
influencing international agreements by lobbying state officials.  Perhaps nowhere is this approach 
more evident than in the arena of international trade, which presumably pits domestic groups 
seeking access to foreign markets against import-competing groups.21  According to this account, 
the role of partisanship is somewhat inconsequential because politicians act as passive players who 
merely supply the trade policies demanded by the most politically influential domestic interest 
groups.22  Beyond international trade, such accounts resonate in other circumstances where 
international agreements differentially affect the economic (or material) interests of various 
domestic constituencies.23  In this picture, when the material benefits are concentrated and the 
costs diffuse, politically sustainable agreements are more likely.24   One prominent version of this 
account explains the proliferation of international trade agreements in the twentieth century as a 
result of historical forces that increased the political salience of export groups seeking market 
access relative to import-competing groups.25 
 
 Another variant of constituency-driven explanations emphasizes the use of international 
legal agreements as pre-commitment devices, used to lock in democracy domestically.26   According 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2000); see also Dan Kahan, David Hoffman, & Donald Braman,  Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and 
the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV 837 (2009). 
21 See Gene M. Grossman  & Elhanan Helpman, Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics, 63 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 265, 265 (1996) (stating theory of interactions between interest groups making campaign contributions 
and political parties setting policies); Alan O Sykes, Protectionism as a “Safeguard”: A Positive Analysis of the GATT “Escape 
Clause” with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 281-82 (1991) (explaining the existence of escape clauses 
through interest group theory); see also Jide Nzelibe, The Credibility Imperative: The Political Dynamics of Retaliation in the 
World Trade Organization's Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 215, 223 (2005) (discussing the 
role of interest groups in enhancing WTO enforcement);  John O. McGinnis & Mark Movsesian, The World Trade 
Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 546-47 (2000) (discussing the role of interest groups in hampering and 
encouraging international trade).  Indeed, some scholars have also argued that interest groups play a key role in 
government decisions to initiate litigation before the WTO.  See GREGORY SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC-
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN WTO LITIGATION (2003).  
22 See Helen V. Milner and Benjamin Judkins, Partisanship, Trade Policy, and Globalization: Is There a Left–Right 
Divide on Trade Policy?, 48 INT’L STUD. Q. 95, 99 (2004) (discussing the absence of partisan factors in the interest group 
account of international trade policymaking).  
23 See Quan Li and Dale L. Smith, Testing Alternative Theories of Capital Control Liberalization, 19 REV POL 
RESEARCH 28 (2005).    There is also a related literature that suggests that powerful countries will use international 
economic institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, to promote the broad material interests of their 
domestic commercial constituencies.  See Thomas Oatley & Jason Yackee, American Interests and IMF Lending, 41 INT’L 
POL. 415 (2004).   
24 Understandably, given that consumers tend to be unorganized compared to industry sectors, they are 
usually given short shrift in constituency-driven accounts of international trade agreements although from a normative 
perspective free trade is supposed to benefit consumers.  
25 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GILLIGAN, EMPOWERING EXPORTERS: RECIPROCITY, DELEGATION, AND COLLECTIVE 
ACTION IN AMERICAN TRADE POLICY (1997). 
26 See Tom Ginsburg et al., Commitment and Diffusion: How and Why National Constitutions Incorporate 
International Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 201; Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment and 
International Law, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 707 (2006); Andrew Moravscik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes:  




to this account, elites or domestic interests who negotiate democratic transitions worry that 
democratic benefits bargained for today may not endure because they cannot credibly commit 
future politicians to uphold the deal.  To overcome this commitment problem, these elites attempt 
to entrench such domestic bargains in international legal agreements with the expectation that 
such agreements cannot easily be undone by future politicians who may have anti-democratic 
preferences.27  This explanation is rooted in the reality of time-inconsistent preferences among 
political actors in transitional regimes who may be prone to sacrifice important democratic 
principles in the future either because of weak domestic institutions or the lack of a track record of 
liberal political values.  Thus, this account may not have broad explanatory power across different 
regime types.  Indeed, even the leading proponents of this account, Andrew Moravscik and Tom 
Ginsburg, concede that the choices faced by political actors in designing international agreements 
differ fundamentally from those faced by actors in more established democracies.28  There is also a 
related literature on constitutional diffusion which argues that there is positive relationship 
between economic liberalization and the diffusion of first generation rights, such a free speech and 
property rights.29   But this latter literature does not focus on the spread or proliferation of 
international law explicitly, but on how global migration and investment flows influence the 
spread of constitutional rights across borders.  
 
Ultimately, none of these accounts take seriously the possibility that international 
commitments may be supported or opposed instrumentally by political parties—or partisan elites—
to advance their policy or electoral objectives.  To an extent, the interest group account is primarily 
(if not exclusively) concerned with how international agreements affect discrete policy outcomes 
favored by specific domestic groups rather than how such agreements may affect the policy or 
electoral goals of major political parties.  On the contrary, the conventional wisdom is that 
domestic politics is radically different from foreign policy and that in international affairs 
partisanship stops at the “water’s edge.”30    
 
Typically, the “water’s edge” thesis embraces a unitary model of state action in which parties 
across the political spectrum share a common vision of foreign policy and in which the political 
opposition does not have much to gain by subverting the foreign policy agenda of the ruling 
                                                                                                                                                             
Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421 (2000); Steven R. Ratner, Precommitment Theory and 
International Law: Starting a Conversation, 81 TEX. L. REV. 2055 (2003). 
27 See Moravscik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes, supra note __ at  220.  
28 See id. at 220 (‘It follows that ‘self-binding’ is of most to newly established democracies, which have the 
greatest interest in further stabilizing the domestic political status quo against democratic threats.”); Ginsburg, Locking 
in Democracy, supra note __ at 712 (“ International law, I argue, is a particularly useful device for certain kinds of 
states, namely those that are undergoing a transition to democracy. By bonding the government's behavior to 
international standards and raising the price of deviation, international law commitments in the constitution may help 
to “lock in” democracy domestically by giving important interest groups more confidence in the regime.”) 
29 See David S. Law, Globalization and the Future of Constitutional Rights, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1277 (2008);  
Mark Tushnet, The Inevitable Globalization of Constitutional Law, 49 V J. INT’L L 985 (2008). 
30 See Gowa, supra note __ at 307-08.  However, there has been a long political science tradition that explores 
how political parties have adapted to the forces of economic globalization.  See GEOFFREY GARETT, PARTISAN POLITICS 
IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (1998).  But this literature does not necessarily examine whether parties embrace global 




regime.31  But as many commentators have observed, bipartisan consensus on foreign affairs in the 
post-cold war era is becoming less common and there is increasing similarity in how partisan elites 
approach both domestic and foreign policy issues.32  More recently, a relatively small number of 
international relations scholars have started to acknowledge the role of partisan groups in 
influencing both international cooperation and foreign military engagements.33  For instance, 
scholars like Helen Milner and Benjamin Judkins have shown empirically that left-leaning parties 
tend to exhibit weaker support for free trade policies than their right leaning counterparts.34  This 
new literature has observed that the domestic redistributive politics of international legal regimes 
do not always fit squarely within traditional interest group accounts.  But this literature has not 
provided a coherent theoretical account of when and how political parties are likely to use 
international law instrumentally.   
 
Significantly, a key insight of this new wave of constituency-driven accounts is that parties are 
not simply passive receptacles for the preferences of dominant interest groups.  First, the 
assumption that political parties have a primary interest in securing power suggests that there will 
often be a conflict between a party’ s office seeking and an interest group’s  policy seeking 
objectives.35  More broadly, as some commentators have observed, it is perhaps better to think as 
parties as loyal agents for different societal principals who usually have conflicting or inconsistent 
preferences.36  In this framework, interest groups—or societal principals—are more likely to lobby 
successfully for their preferred policy goals when their favored partisan agents are in power.37  
Thus, for instance, contrary to the typical pluralist account which focuses largely on either the 
                                                 
31 See Gowa, supra note __ at 307-09. 
32 See, e.g., Mark Souva & David Rohde, Elite Opinion Differences and Partisanship in Congressional Foreign Policy, 
1975-1996, 60 POL. RES. Q 113 (2007); James M. McCormick et al, Politics and Bipartisanship at the Water’s Edge: A Note 
on Bush and Clinton, 30 POLITY 133 (1997); James M. McCormick & Eugene R Wittkopf, Bipartisanship, Partisanship, 
and Ideology in Congressional-Executive Policy Relations, 1947-1988, 52 J. POL. 1077 (1990).  
33 For instance, in one influential study that respond to Gowa’s water’s edge thesis with respect to conflict 
initiation, Howell and Pevehouse show that the strength of the President’s party in Congress is positively related to the 
decision to engage in conflict up until 1973, when the War Powers Act was enacted.  See William G. Howell & Jon C 
Pevehouse, Presidents, Congress, and the Use of Force, 59 INT’L ORG. 209 (2005). Kenneth Anderson has also emphasized 
the role that international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) play in framing international policy debates, 
including those that have obvious ideological implications.  See Kenneth Anderson, The Limits of Pragmatism in 
American Foreign Policy: Unsolicited Advice to the Bush Administration on Relations with International Non-Governmental 
Organizations, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L 371 (2001). 
 
34 See Helen V. Milner and Benjamin Judkins, Partisanship, Trade Policy, and Globalization: Is There a Left–Right 
Divide on Trade Policy?, 48 INT’L STUD. Q. 95 (2004); see also Joseph M Grieco et al, When Preferences and Commitment 
Collide: The Effect of Partisan Shifts on International Treaty Compliance, 63 INT’L ORG. 341 (2009) (“[O]ther things being 
equal, a leftward shift in a government’s partisan placement is likely to result in a set of official policy views that are 
less hospitable to an open foreign exchange market, notwithstanding international legal commitments on this matter 
by a previous government.”). 
35 See Thomas L Brunell, The Relationship between Political Parties and Interest Groups:  Explaining the Patterns of 
PAC Contributions to candidates for Congress, 58 Pol. Res. Q. 681 (2005) (discussing the competing goals of parties 
seeking power and interest groups seeking to maximize their preferred policy outcomes).  
36 See, e.g., David H Bearce, Societal Preferences, Partisan Agents, and Monetary Policy Outcomes, 57 INT’ ORG. 373 
(2003) (applying the party as agent framework with respect to exchange rate stability).  




relative resources of competing interest groups to explain the demand for policy, labor groups 
seeking more protectionist policies may find themselves largely out of luck when a right-leaning 
government is in power, regardless of the level of resources deployed by such labor groups.  
Correspondingly, export-oriented groups seeking greater market access may find their ability to 
influence international trade policy constrained under left-leaning governments.  Of course, 
political parties may sometimes go against the grain and seek to curry favor with interest groups 
that are not part of their core support network, but this phenomenon is sufficiently uncommon 
that it may be colloquially associated with the so-called “Nixon Goes to China” effect. 38 
 
 Second, and relatedly, voters often associate parties with specific ideological positions or 
issues, giving parties little flexibility to change their platforms to suit the policy preferences of 
certain interest groups without simultaneously sacrificing their political brand and credibility.  
Politicians who simply stray away from long-held partisan positions may incur significant costs 
from their core-constituencies.39   More broadly, as some commentators have observed,40 parties 
generally develop reputations for addressing certain issues better than others and have an incentive 
to emphasize those issues on which they have an electoral advantage.  Thus, rather than compete 
according to a spatial model of voting where each party stakes out different positions on the same 
issue,41 parties tend to own issues and then often try to compete by convincing voters that their 
issues are the most important.42  As one commentator famously put it, “[p]arties do not debate 
positions on a single issue, but try instead to make end runs around each other on different 
issues.”43  For instance, in the United States, Democrats have cultivated a better reputation for 
handling social welfare and health issues, whereas Republicans seem to have an electoral advantage 
in national security, drugs, and crime.44  Generally, the core issues owned by each party tend to 
remain relatively stable over time.  Trespassing on another party’s issue, while not uncommon, 
tends to be fraught with significant political risks.  Thus, for instance, the Republican Party may 
not be very credible if it announces that it will pursue aggressively a pro-labor or rights agenda 
because longstanding issue associations are likely going to trump the self-serving statements of 
elected officials.  
 
 The implications of partisan issue ownership for the choice of international legal 
commitments are significant.  The electoral benefits that politicians receive from issue ownership 
will usually be a function of both the saliency of those issues and the opportunities for carrying 
them out.  For instance, international commitments can be used to raise the salience of an issue 
                                                 
38 For an insightful discussion of this effect in which parties left-politicians have an incentive to pursue right 
leaning goals, and vice versa, see Robert Goodin, Voting Through the Looking Glass, 77 AM. POL. SC. REV. 420 (1983). 
39 See M. Daniel Berhardt & Daniel E. Ingberman, Candidate reputations and the ‘incumbency effect, 27 J POL. 
ECON. 47 (1985). 
40 John R Petrocik, Issue Ownership and Presidential Campaigning, 1952-2000, 118 POL S Q 599 (2003); Eric 
Belanger et al, Issue salience, issue ownership, and issue-based vote choice, 27 Electoral Stud. 477 (2008).  
41 See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957) (discussing the spatial model of 
partisan competition).  
42 See Petrocik, supra note __ at 599-601.  
43 William H. Riker, Introduction, in AGENDA FORMATION 4 (William Riker ed. 1993). 




before a domestic audience.45  In this picture, politicians will seek to make the international 
concerns associated with the issues they own “the programmatic meaning of the election and the 
criteria by which voters make their choice.”46  If a party’s favored issue becomes enshrined in an 
international legal commitment, it increases the likelihood that such an issue will remain part of 
the political agenda across multiple electoral periods.  
 
The next section builds upon these latter constituency-driven accounts and sketches how 
certain domestic structural factors in the United States political system might encourage partisan 
elites to use international agreements to overcome domestic barriers to their ideological and 
electoral objectives.  In particular, when the ideological (or material) preferences between certain 
powerful partisan elites and those of foreign states and/or interpreters of international law are 
aligned, such elites may seek to use international law to entrench their preferred policies against a 
potentially hostile future government. 
 
II. THE PARTISAN LOGIC OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PREFERENCES 
 
A. The Theoretical Foundation 
 
The notion that partisan struggles influence the domestic demand for international law relies 
on theories that emphasize the instrumental origins of institutions.  According to such theories, 
most political institutions are not “best explained as a superior response to collective goals or 
benefits, but, rather, as a by-product of conflicts over distributional gains.”47  Anticipating this dynamic, 
politicians will choose institutional arrangements with an eye to the likely policy and electoral 
outcomes that will result.48  In the context of international law, this means that partisan elites may 
have an incentive to strategically expand the geographical scope of political conflict across borders 
if they believe it will isolate the domestic political opposition and enhance the influence of foreign 
actors with whom they share similar political objectives.49   
                                                 
45 See SHANTO IYENGAR AND DONALD R. KINDER, NEWS THAT Matters (1987).  To some extent, politicians 
do not necessarily have complete control over the saliency of their issues; on the contrary, exogenous events such as an 
attack by foreign adversaries or changes in global economic conditions may elevate or erode the salience of a party’s 
issue in unanticipated ways.    
46 John R Petrocik, Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study, 40 AMER. J. POL. SC. 825, 
828 (1996).  
47 JACK KNIGHT, INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL CONFLICT 19 (1992) (emphasis added).  
48 The instrumental use of institutions is a very familiar theme in the judicial politics literature. See e.g.,  
Howard Gillman, How Political Parties can Use Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-
1891, 96 AM POL. SC. REV. 511 (2002);  John Ferejohn, Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 41 (2002); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 Va. L. Rev. 
1045, 1066 (2001);  see also Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term: Foreword: The Constitutionalization of 
Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29 (2004).  For a discussion of how political actors try to exercise control over 
courts across different countries, including the transitional regimes in Eastern Europe see Gretchen Helmke, The Logic 
of Strategic Defection: Court-Executive Relations in Argentina Under Dictatorship and Democracy, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 291 
(2002); Lee Epstein et al., The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of 
Government, 35 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 117 (2001) (developing a model that explores the interaction between politicians 
and courts in Russia). 
49 The notion that governments may strategically seek to pursue their policy objectives at different levels of 





Some implications flow from this basic insight.  First, partisan entrenchment through 
international law is likely going to be most useful to a governing party when it faces significant 
domestic hurdles to its policy and electoral agenda.  In a democratic system with multiple veto 
points, incumbent regimes that are incapable of influencing policy outcomes directly against a 
recalcitrant and powerful domestic opposition may resort to international agreements or 
institutions to implement their preferred policy goals.  Such a strategy is more likely when the 
domestic opposition is able to use other domestic institutions or structures to thwart significant 
policy initiatives by the governing party, even when the opposition may be in a minority in both 
the executive and legislative branches.  For instance, in a federalist structure where the opposition 
has obtained political authority in certain states, the governing party may opt to use international 
law to sidestep federalist barriers to conventional legislation.  Conversely, a party that stands to 
lose when a specific policy is addressed at the international level may prefer to have the locus of 
decision-making moved to the local or state level.  Furthermore, in the context where specific 
political parties exhibit fluctuating policy preferences over time, elected leaders may also elect to 
use international law to lock in policy objectives goals as a hedge against an increasingly insecure 
and unpredictable domestic policy arena. 
 
Second, international commitments may not only be used to elevate an incumbent 
government’s favored partisan issue, but also to constrain the ability of the opposition to promote 
its favored issues.  In other words, effective institutional entrenchment of a policy (or ideological) 
preference may not only have the effect of insulating that policy issue in the future from the 
vagaries of electoral politics, but also freezing out issues in which the political opposition has an 
electoral advantage.50  Voters tend to judge politicians as a bundle of issue possibilities.  Where it is 
unlikely that a politician can act on an issue either because of legal or institutional constraints, 
then the rational voter will very likely discount the relevance of that issue at the ballot box.  Thus, 
all else being equal, we would expect politicians to prefer international commitments (or other 
institutional arrangements) that increase the possibilities for locking in those issues in which they 
have an electoral advantage and that constrain the possibilities for carrying out those issues that 
favor the opposition.51  
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50 For instance, political scientists have long claimed that strategic policy entrenchment was a key feature of 
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‘depoliticization,’ in the sense that it sought to remove from political contention the fundamental normative choices 
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Steve Teles, Conservative Mobilization against Entrenched Liberalism, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS:  
ACTIVIST GOVERNMENT AND THE RISE OF CONSERVATISM 162 (Paul Pierson & Theda Skocpol ed., 2007).   
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But certain preconditions have to be in place to make partisan entrenchment through 
international law appealing to the governing party.  First, international commitments will tend to 
favor those political parties that are in a position to find agreeable or friendly transnational 
partners in either the institutions that interpret or enforce international law or among the 
governing coalitions (or ruling elites) of other states.  As Moravscik has observed, transnational 
alliances may emerge when “domestic groups in more than one country agree to cooperate or 
exchange political assets in order to prevail against other groups or over government opposition.”52  
In the United States, for instance, foreign pressure on human and social rights issues may tend to 
benefit certain left-leaning groups because of a convergence of interests between these groups and 
the European elites who may be more sympathetic to the welfare state and a progressive vision of 
social rights than the median American voter.53  To the extent groups across the political spectrum 
are not disadvantaged in building transnational coalitions for their causes, however, the 
redistributive effect of creating such coalitions will become more ambiguous and one-sided 
partisan resistance will likely be blunted.   
 
Second, the relevant political and institutional conditions underlying an international legal 
commitment or regime have to be stable and resistant to change to make it worthwhile for 
politicians seeking to use it to entrench their policy preferences.  Observing that politicians may 
occasionally use international commitments for partisan purposes tells us very little about its 
success as a strategy.  International commitments may not be of much instrumental value if they 
can be undone once the political opposition comes into power.  Thus, the salient question is 
whether international commitments are likely to remain binding across multiple electoral cycles, 
regardless of whether the commitment is the result of a negotiated international agreement or 
customary international law.  
 
To be sure, political entrenchment by partisan actors, whereby a current governing coalition 
attempts to embed its preferences in ways that constrain its successors, is a fairly common strategy 
in domestic politics.54  Just as legislators use super-statutes or other legislative tactics to entrench 
their preferences,55 they can use international law as a useful alternative vehicle for entrenching 
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52 Moravscik, Introduction, in DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC 
POLITICS 32 ( Peter B. Evans et al. ed. 1993). 
53 See discussion in text at infra notes__ 
54 The strategic entrenchment of partisan goals through a sympathetic judiciary is a common theme in the 
judicial politics literature.  See Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: 
Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511, 521 (2002) (describing 19th century efforts by 
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policy goals when uncertain about the commitment of the political opposition to these goals.  This 
strategic use of international law may even be more effective than domestic entrenchment 
strategies. Recently, Rachel Brewster has argued convincingly that reversing international 
agreements may actually be harder than changing domestic statutes because of the additional costs 
imposed by an international audience when there is a breach.56   
 
In practice, however, governments have often defied international legal commitments that are 
inconsistent with their partisan preferences.  To start, politicians may formally exit treaties or other 
international commitments entered into by previous regimes.57  Of course, one may plausibly 
argue that governments that exit treaties or fail to comply with their international commitments 
on one issue may suffer reputational costs in other issue areas.58  But assuming that a government’s 
partisan orientation and policy preferences are likely to be known in advance to an international 
audience, it is hard to see how that government’s failure to comply  with an international 
agreement that is inconsistent with its preferences should also affect its reputation and willingness 
to comply with those agreements that align with its preferences.59  Simply put, in a fragmented 
system of international law, there is very little reason to think that a reputation for compliance 
would be fungible across multiple issue areas.60   
 
 More broadly, formally withdrawing from or defying an international commitment does not 
necessarily exhaust the options available to the party that disfavors such a commitment.  Many 
international commitments depend on domestic state actors to secure implementation of the 
commitment’s provisions.  In such circumstances, one may reasonably conjecture that there will be 
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variations in the level of implementation of such a commitment depending on the preferences of 
the governing party.61  For instance, during the 1990s, British Prime Minister John Major ignored 
an adverse European Court of Justice ruling on EU Working Time mandates that conflicted with 
his conservative government’s views on labor policies.62  More broadly, the available evidence 
regarding cross-national implementation of EU policy directives seems to support the conjecture of 
partisan-inspired implementation.  In one study, Oliver Treib showed that the success or failure to 
implement EU Directives across four countries turned largely on whether it corresponded with the 
partisan objectives of the government in power.63  Indeed, this study also shows that when the 
governing party favored any EU Directive for political reasons, it actually tended to over-
implement the Directive’s provisions.64     
  
B. Conditions Likely to Influence the Electoral Sustainability of International Law 
 
What then are the conditions under which partisan international legal commitments are likely 
to be sustainable across multiple electoral cycles?  Admittedly, it is difficult to answer such a 
question with any empirical certainty, but one may reasonably speculate that the extended stability 
of such partisan commitments most likely depends on two factors: the availability of side benefits 
to the opposition party and the level of fragmentation within the domestic political institutions.   
 
i. Prospects for Cross-Partisan Issue Bundling 
 
The electoral sustainability of an international legal commitment is more likely if it also 
includes some benefits to coalitions within the non-enacting political opposition.  Thus, an 
agreement is likely to have greater staying power if it is negotiated and ratified behind a thick veil 
of ignorance.65  Such a commitment need not include partisan benefits that are symmetric across 
the enacting incumbent government and the political opposition; on the contrary, it may work as 
long as the opposition is conflicted enough that it is unable to marshal the will to repeal or refuse 
implementation of the international commitment once it obtains power.  Simply put, partisan 
entrenchment is both rational and plausible for an incumbent government if its preferences in 
favor of the commitment are quite intense, but intra-party conflicts within the political opposition 
leave the opposition ambivalent about the international commitment.  Thus, insofar as a forward-
looking enacting coalition wants to increase the durability of an international agreement that 
advances its partisan objectives, it has an incentive to include provisions in the agreement that 
offer side-payments to a potentially hostile successor government.  While the political opposition 
may often be losers because certain politically unfavorable issues are embodied in an international 
                                                 
61 For a theoretical model that supports the notion that compliance should be contingent on the preferences 
of competing domestic constituents, see Xinyuan  Dai, The Conditional Nature of Democratic Compliance, 50 J CONFLICT 
RES. 690 (2006). 
62 Oliver Treib, EU Governance, Misfit and the Partisan Logic of Domestic Adaptation:  An Actor-Centered Perspective 
on the Transposition of EU Directives, available at http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.ed/socialeurope 
63 Oliver Treib, EU Governance, Misfit and the Partisan Logic of Domestic Adaptation:  An Actor-Centered Perspective 
on the Transposition of EU Directives, available at http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.ed/socialeurope  
64 See id. 
65 For a concise discussion of the role of the veil of ignorance in institutional design, please see Adrian 




legal commitment, they are not always losers in the larger picture because issues that favor them 
are also part of the package.66  Bundling, in effect, may help diminish the political stakes in 
adopting an international commitment and ensure that the commitment serves the parties' joint 
interests, at least partially.  
 
ii. The Fragmentation of Domestic Institutions 
 
Second, the ability of partisan elites to entrench their preferences in international 
commitments will depend significantly on the level of fragmentation within domestic political 
institutions.   All else being equal, the use of international legal commitments for instrumental 
purposes will remain less likely when restrictive domestic institutions make it too costly to adopt or 
implement such commitments.  Thus, partisans or domestic groups who stand to lose from 
international law have an incentive to use the existence of multiple veto points or fragmented 
domestic institutions to their advantage, while proponents will seek to overcome these 
institutional barriers through the use of courts or other autonomous bureaucrats.  In other words, 
parties are likely to treat domestic institutions as a set of obstacles to be exploited or to be 
maneuvered around in pursuit of their partisan political objectives in the international arena.     
 
To be clear, the strategic use of policy veto points for instrumental political goals is a common 
theme in the political science literature.67  These accounts, however, do not make explicit the ways 
through which partisan actors may use veto points to achieve their policy goals.  For the most part, 
the social science commentary tends to treat the existence of veto points as highly inflexible 
exogenous constraints on policy actors.68  According to such accounts, as the supposed number of 
veto players increases, the more difficult it will be for domestic groups to change the policy status 
quo.  Thus, the feasible range policy proposals will be necessarily dictated by the preferences of all 
veto players.      
 
In real life, however, the story is much more complicated.  In many circumstances, the actual 
scope of legal authority of veto players may be ambiguous or ill-defined.  Determined partisans, 
who are aware of this legal landscape, may very well exploit this ambiguity to their electoral or 
policy advantage.  In the United States, for instance, it is somewhat unclear from a constitutional 
perspective whether international agreements have to be approved exclusively through the Treaty 
Clause, which requires the approval of two-thirds of the Senate, or through a congressional-
executive agreement, which only requires a simple majority of both houses of Congress.69  
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Moreover, another recurring but unresolved question is the extent to which treaties should be 
presumptively treated as self-executing in the absence of subsequent legislation or explicit treaty 
language.70  Finally, another recurring question in the literature is the extent to which non-ratified 
international agreements or state practices may be used as evidence of customary international law 
in the United States and the extent to which customary international law may be federal law that 
binds the constituent states under the Supremacy Clause.71     
 
Of course, there is a rich literature in the legal academy that debates the scope of these 
constitutional constraints.  This Article does not attempt to join these normative debates, but 
instead suggests that the resultant constitutional ambiguity is fraught with different strategic 
considerations for domestic groups seeking to support or oppose international legal commitments.  
For instance, the ambiguities in the American federal system provide the opposition with the 
opportunity to exercise considerable political power over regions and then use that power to resist 
the adoption or implementation of unfavorable international legal commitments. Similarly, 
proponents of international legal commitments in the United States may attempt to use courts to 
overcome the obstacles created by domestic fragmentation of power.  One plausible aspect of this 
latter strategy, which has attracted significant controversy in the literature, involves the possibility 
of using federal courts to enforce customary international norms against the states without prior 
statutory or treaty authority.72  In this picture, since customary international law itself does not 
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necessarily require formal legislative action by the political branches, a partisan-friendly court 
acting as an autonomous policy leader may be able to use customary international law to overcome 
some of the substantive barriers imposed by federalism and the separation of powers. 
 
But aside from federalism and separation of powers considerations, presidents also have 
considerable latitude in interpreting the scope of United States obligations under existing 
international legal commitments.  In other words, within the matrix of domestic political 
institutions in the United States, federal courts have routinely deferred to the President’s view as 
to what specific treaties or customary international law obligations require.73  In this picture, 
presidents have significant leeway to interpret an international legal commitment expansively if it 




Does categorizing a democratic government by its partisan orientation predict its attitude 
towards specific international law commitments?  To answer that question, and to compare the 
electoral sustainability of specific kinds of international commitments, I examine Republican and 
Democrat responses to the negotiation and ratification of human rights treaties in the 1950s and 
the ratification of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993.   
 
 Admittedly, given the limited scope of these two case studies, the most I can hope to achieve is 
to show that partisan motivations are a plausible factor in the decision of state actors to either 
support or oppose international law across a wide range of issue areas.  Moreover, the illustrations 
below have an obvious parochial slant in that they focus exclusively on the partisan dynamics 
surrounding the adoption and enforcement of international law in the United States.  There is 
reason to think, however, that there is some empirical support for similar strategic political 
behavior outside the United States, especially with respect to ongoing debates surrounding 
European integration. 74  
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interpretation of international law.  Nonetheless, as descriptive matter, most commentators agree that courts do 
accord substantial deference.  See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649 (2000); 
see also Robert M. Chesney, Disaggregating Deference: The Judicial Power and Executive Treaty Interpretations, 92 Iowa L 
Rev 1723 (2007);  Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230 (2007); 
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A. Opposing Perceived Partisan Entrenchment: The Post-War Human Rights Treaty 
Controversies 
 
 The controversy surrounding both the Bricker Amendment and the post-war effort to ratify 
human rights agreements in the United States is familiar to many international law scholars and is 
recounted in detail elsewhere.75  In brief, in the immediate aftermath of WWII, President Truman 
was facing mounting political pressure to be more proactive on a range of social policy and civil 
rights issues.76  In this political climate, conservatives feared that the United States’ growing 
involvement in the United Nations would have an adverse effect on federal and state control over 
social and economic policy.77  Moreover, in a growing number of civil rights claims coming before 
federal and state courts during this period, plaintiffs often invoked the UN Charter, and some 
courts appeared to be sympathetic to this legal strategy.78 President Truman subsequently 
negotiated two UN human rights treaties: the Genocide Convention and the Convention on the 
Political Rights of Women.  To underscore the political contentiousness underlying both of these 
treaties, neither was ratified during the Truman administration; indeed, the Genocide Convention 
was only ratified by the Senate in 1986—forty years after it was first signed.79  In any event, 
skepticism regarding these human rights treaties became a key plank of the 1952 and 1956 
Republican Party platforms.  “We shall see to it,” both of these platforms declared, “that no treaty 
or agreement with other countries deprives our citizens of the rights guaranteed them by the 
Federal Constitution.”80  Leading the Republican charge against the ratification of various human 
rights treaties was Senator Bricker of Ohio, who sought to introduce a constitutional amendment 
                                                 
75 See Duane Tananbaum, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A TEST OF EISENHOWER’S POLITICAL 
LEADERSHIP (1988).  
76 As one commentator observes: 
Frank Delano Roosevelt understood that civil rights could prove explosive for the Democrats, and he 
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presence of black in northern cities to whom he had to appeal electorally. 
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77 See Arthur Dean, The Bricker Amendment and Authority over Foreign Affairs, 32 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1 (1953). 
78See e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 649-60  (1948) (“There are additional reasons now why that law 
stands as an obstacle to the free accomplishment of our policy in the international field. One of these reasons is that 
we have recently pledged ourselves to cooperate with the United Nations to ‘promote * * * universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion.  How can this nation be faithful to this international pledge if state laws which bar land ownership and 
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litigants have approached UN human rights agreements, please see  Bert B. Lockwood, The United Nations Charter and 
United States Civil Rights Litigation: 1946-1955, 69 IOWA L REV 901  (1983-84). 
79 In his narrative account of his role in supporting the Bricker Amendment, former American Bar 
Association President Holman provides some insight as to why the Geneva Convention was not ratified under 
Truman.  See FRANK T. HOLMAN, STORY OF THE “BRICKER” AMENDMENT 7 (1954) (“It was not ratified—due to the 
studies and the opposition of the American bar Association.”); see also Natalie Hevener KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS 
TREATIES AND THE SENATE : A HISTORY OF OPPOSITION 37-62 (1990) (discussing the intense and politicized 
ratification debates over the Geneva convention).   




that would include language stating that “a treaty shall become effective as internal law in the 
United States only through legislation which would be valid in the absence of a treaty.”81 
 
The legal background to the Bricker Amendment movement involved the 1920 Supreme 
Court decision in Missouri v. Holland, which held that a treaty could empower the Congress to pass 
legislation, which in the absence of the treaty, would be reserved to the exclusive power of the 
states.82  In the late 1940s and early 1950s, fears mounted that the Supreme Court’s decision 
might provide an institutional loophole for bypassing existing constitutional barriers for enacting 
certain forms of domestic legislation.83  However, Senator Bricker’s effort to amend the 
Constitution eventually fizzled after the Republican President Eisenhower came to power.  His 
Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, made it clear that the administration did not intend to 
support ratification of any of the UN human rights treaties that were at the core of the 
controversy.84  In the end, although Senator Bricker’s effort narrowly failed to muster the requisite 
supermajority in the Senate vote required for the Amendment to pass the first constitutional 
hurdle, it set the stage for the prolonged political resistance to Senate ratification of human rights 
treaties in the United States that various commentators claim continues to this day.85 
 
Much of the scholarship on the Bricker Amendment and the Senate’s post-war opposition to 
human rights treaties has tended to focus narrowly on special interest politics, especially the role of 
southern segregationists and allied conservative groups.86  For instance, in their detailed account of 
the legacy of the Bricker Amendment for the modern human rights movement, Kaufman and 
Whiteman stress the racially motivated concerns of conservative groups who “took very seriously 
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83 See Holman, supra note __ at 17 
84 See Holman, supra note __ at 36.  More specifically, Secretary Dulles stated during congressional hearings: 
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L. 341 (1995); Natalie Hevener Kaufman & David Whiteman, Opposition to Human Rights Treaties in the United States 
Senate: The Legacy of the Bricker Amendment, 10 HUM. RTS. Q. 309 (1988). 
86See Andrew Moravscik, The Paradox of US Human Rights Policy, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS146 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005) (describing conservative opposition to human rights treaties in the United 
States); see also  Henkin, supra note at 348 (“The campaign for the Bricker Amendment apparently represented a move 
by anti-civil-rights and “states' rights” forces to seek to prevent--in particular--bringing an end to racial discrimination 
and segregation by international treaty”); Natalie Hevener Kaufman & David Whiteman, Opposition to Human Rights 
Treaties in the United States Senate: The Legacy of the Bricker Amendment, 10 HUM. RTS. Q. 309, 310 (1988); see also 
Natale Hevener Kaufman, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE SENATE : A HISTORY OF OPPOSITION 12-16 (1990). To 
be sure, Kaufman also emphasizes cold-war concerns by conservative groups about the spread of socialist and 
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any discussion of federal action to dismantle segregation within the states.”87  While these interest-
group-capture accounts have proven quite useful in explaining particular aspects of post-war 
human rights treaty skepticism, they are nonetheless incomplete.   
 
First, the notion that conflicts over human rights treaties in the United States can be best 
explained by narrow special interest capture rests on questionable premises.  At bottom, the 
politics underlying international human rights treaty ratification are not best characterized as 
diffuse costs borne by the majority with concentrated benefits accruing largely to conservative 
special interest groups.   On the contrary, there is usually intense lobbying by ideological groups on 
both sides of the issue, making dependence on interest-group-capture theories particularly 
problematic. More broadly, there is no reason to suppose that conservative interest groups either 
wielded more political clout or had more intense preferences than progressive interest groups on 
human rights or civil rights issues in the post-war decades.  For instance, progressive ideological 
groups had achieved varying degrees of success in pushing civil rights and social policy reform 
through either domestic legislation or public impact litigation from the 1950s to the mid-1960s, 
and had managed to do so by overcoming many of the same obstacles supposedly imposed by 
federalism and the separation of powers in the human rights treaty context.88 As discussed below, 
the post war dynamic with respect to human rights treaties is better explained by partisan interest 
group competition, and not capture by any specific set of interest groups.89  
 
Second, the strong emphasis on southern segregationist influences in the interest group 
account of the Bricker Amendment is somewhat misleading.  To be sure, various southern 
Senators (and interest groups) were deeply skeptical about the proliferation of human rights 
treaties in the post-war era, but it is difficult to argue that opposition to civil rights was the driving 
force behind the Bricker Amendment movement.  Take, for instance, the partisan and 
geographical distribution of the Senate sponsors of the amendment. The key sponsor, Senator 
Bricker, was a Midwestern politician and the 1944 Republican vice presidential candidate who had 
been a long time foe of Roosevelt’s New Deal initiatives,90 but who otherwise exhibited little or no 
interest in the post-war civil rights movement.91  Another sponsor, Republican Senator Robert 
Taft, also from Ohio and an opponent of the New Deal, happened to be a strong supporter of civil 
rights.  In 1946, Senator Taft had sought to propose legislation that would effectively abolish racial 
discrimination in the workplace—about twenty years before the Civil Rights Act of 1964.92  More 
broadly, nineteen out of twenty-four Midwestern Senators supported the proposed Amendment in 
early 1953.93  From a partisan stance, the 1953 version of the Amendment had sixty-four sponsors 
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in the Senate, which included forty-five out of forty-eight Republican Senators, but only thirteen of 
the nineteen Democrat sponsors in the Senate were from the South.94  At bottom, the distribution 
of support and opposition to the various versions of the Amendment transcended traditional 
geographical or ideological lines on issues like segregation,95 with an overwhelming majority of 
Republican Senators from all regions in the country in favor and a significant majority of 
Democratic Senators against.96  Moreover, the array of interest groups in support of the 
Amendment was quite broad, ranging from industry professional groups like the American 
Medical Association, the United States Chamber of Commerce, and the National Economic 
Council to ideological or patriotic groups like the Daughters of the American Revolution.97 
 
We get more traction if we evaluate the controversy surrounding the post-war efforts to ratify 
human rights treaties not simply as a disagreement about isolationism versus internationalism, or 
of special interest politics over desegregation, but as an exercise in distributive partisan politics.  In 
this framework, while both Democrat and Republican Senators in the post-war era might have 
been subject to lobbying by a wide array of economic and ideological groups on human rights 
issues, they were likely to be responsive to very different groups when they had to choose to 
support or oppose the ratification of human rights treaties.  Politicians from both parties likely 
sought a very broad base of support for their policies to get elected, but it was the support from the 
elected official’s core constituency (or interest groups) that was often most crucial.98  Thus, the 
orientation of any party towards human rights agreements during the post-war era was likely to 
reflect the preferences of its key supporters.   
  
Applying this partisan logic to the immediate post war era, the impetus for the Bricker 
amendment movement and the failure of the post-war UN human rights treaty effort become 
clearer.  In the late 1940s, partisan polarization towards the New Deal programs had become quite 
intense.  Among Truman’s supporters, there was a growing concern that Republicans—who had 
won decisive congressional majorities in the 1946 mid-term elections—would muster enough 
political support to roll back the core pillars of the New Deal if they also won the White House in 
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1948.99  In his 1948 state of the union address, Truman went on the offensive and pushed for a 
wide-ranging liberal agenda that would substantially cement and expand the New Deal; in sum, he 
promised not only to establish massive new national health insurance and affordable housing 
programs, but to almost double the minimum wage (from forty cents to seventy-five cents an hour), 
and   provide more support for education and farmers.100   
   
In this contentious political climate, certain groups became concerned that Truman might use 
the various UN human rights conventions to push for positive economic rights and civil rights 
objectives that his administration could not otherwise accomplish directly through legislation or 
unilaterally through executive action.101  Bricker crowed, for instance, that the UN Covenant for 
Human Rights “was an ingenious mechanism designed to stifle all criticism of the so-called Fair 
Deal.”102  And these concerns were not necessarily without foundation.  As Elizabeth Borgwardt 
points out in her exhaustive study on the effect of the New Deal on globalization, human rights in 
the post-war era often served as shorthand for an idea that also embraced Roosevelt’s vision of 
Four Freedoms, which included “basic conceptions of economic justice.”103  With the support of 
progressive groups, the Committee for Civil Rights that Truman established had seriously flirted 
with the idea of using UN human rights treaties as a tool for bypassing domestic obstacles to social 
and economic reform, (such as federalism and separation of powers).104  However, this strategy 
faced one significant obstacle:  many of the relevant UN Human Rights Covenants that directly 
addressed civil rights issues—such as the proposed UN Convention on Human Rights and the 
Genocide Convention—had not been ratified by the United States Senate.  However, the UN 
Charter had been ratified as a treaty, and at least two of its articles seemed relevant to the civil 
rights cause.105  The Truman Committee viewed these Charter provisions as a plausible alternative 
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With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well being which are necessary for peaceful 
and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights . . ., the 
United Nations shall promote 
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and 
social progress living, full employment and conditions of social progress and development;  
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and 
international cultural and educational cooperation; and  
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. 
 




legal vehicle for advancing progressive civil rights policies, and human rights activists and legal 
academics provided fodder for the notion that the UN Charter was legally binding in the United 
States as a matter of domestic law.106  The favorable political context created by the Truman 
administration meant that courts could act with considerable latitude, and many cited the UN 
Charter favorably in the early postwar civil rights cases.107   
 
Against this background, the ratification of the United Nation human rights treaties 
emerged as both a partisan and a sectional cleavage issue for two key reasons.  First, Republican 
Senators overwhelmingly disfavored ratification because none of their party’s core constituencies 
stood to gain much from ratifying these treaties.  These treaties did not offer much in way of cross-
partisan bundling opportunities because most of the obvious distributive benefits favored groups 
aligned with the Democratic Party.   For instance, the key UN human rights covenants included 
positive economic and social rights, such as access to decent living conditions, affordable housing, 
education, income, and employment—objectives that although favored by many groups on the left, 
were largely anathema to core constituencies favoring the Republican Party.108  More broadly, the 
intra-partisan cleavages that sometimes divide right-leaning ideological and business groups were 
noticeably absent; indeed, opposition to the human rights treaties cut across almost all the key 
interest groups that were traditionally hostile to the Roosevelt/Truman New Deal programs, 
including patriot groups like the Daughters of the American Revolution and industry groups like 
the American Medical Association, American Bar Association, and the United States Chamber of 
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The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the 
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International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 12, Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 




Commerce.109 If there was a single ideological or philosophical agenda that united all these various 
right-leaning coalitions it was probably antipathy to New Deal progressivism; indeed, these groups 
ranged from traditional isolationists who disapproved of any meddling by international 
organizations to Republican internationalists who were suspicious that these UN treaties could be 
used as vehicles to promote socialist ideals and Soviet propaganda.110  For the most part, however, 
the industry and professional groups who supported the Amendment were concerned that UN 
human rights treaties would be used to entrench more expansive labor regulations and implement 
socialized health care.111   
 
Second, and more importantly, the post-war UN human rights treaties split the Democratic 
Party’s core electoral coalition between northern liberals and Southern whites who feared such 
treaties could be used as a ploy to push for domestic civil rights reform.  In the late 1940s, strategic 
electoral considerations had meshed with ideological leanings to convince Truman and other 
progressive Democrats that the aggressive promotion of civil rights for African Americans would be 
a smart political idea.  Since the Great Depression, African-Americans, who were once a loyal 
constituency of the party of Lincoln had been drifting steadily to the Democratic Party.  By the 
1946 mid-term elections, however, the Democratic Party’s hold on the African American vote was 
becoming increasingly tenuous as Republicans made significant inroads among African American 
strongholds in the Northeast.112  Seeking to reverse this trend, James Rowe, an attorney and 
leading Democratic operative, drafted a report that was subsequently adopted as a crucial guide for 
Truman’s 1948 election campaign.  “[T]he Northern Negro vote,” the Rowe Report concluded, 
“holds the balance of power in Presidential elections for the simple arithmetic reason that the 
Negroes not only vote in a block but are geographically concentrated in the pivotal, large and 
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closely contested electoral states such as New York, Illinois, Ohio, and Michigan.”113  Ironically, in 
what would eventually prove to be a grave political miscalculation, the Rowe Report assumed that 
the loyalty of Southern Democrats could be taken for granted even if civil rights reform became a 
key part of Truman’s electoral agenda.114   
 
In any event, Southern Democrats feared that Truman would attempt to use UN treaties to 
shore up his support among both northern liberals and a more politically assertive African-African 
base.  Moreover, civil rights groups in the United States were increasingly turning to the United 
Nations as a possible institutional venue for seeking redress against discriminatory Jim Crow 
policies.115  For instance, the National Association for Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 
had formally petitioned the UN in 1947 to complain about the treatment of African Americans.  
The organization claimed that having “failed to find relief through constitutional appeal, [we] find 
ourselves forced to bring this vital issue . . . to the attention of this historic body.”116     
 
All these developments helped trigger the backlash by a coalition of Republicans and Southern 
Democrats in the Senate who subsequently joined forces to support Senator Bricker’s effort to 
amend the treaty power.  But what united this coalition was hardly shared animosity towards the 
cause of African Americans.  Indeed, as some commentators have observed, the certain Republican 
officials had  sought to court the African American vote in the late 1940s but balked at embracing 
civil rights legislation in the workplace because Republican-leaning business constituencies were 
generally opposed to expansion of regulations that would interfere with private commercial 
interests, including anti-discrimination regulation.117  In any event, facing an increasingly split 
Democratic coalition, Truman eventually chose the option of party unity, forgoing a legislative 
agenda to push his civil rights agenda and instead concentrating on pushing reform through the 
courts.118  The human rights treaty controversy nonetheless became part of a larger rift within the 
Democratic Party that drove many prominent Southern politicians who were part of Roosevelt’s 
coalition to support Eisenhower in the 1952 elections. 119  
 
To be sure, one may understand conservative Senators’ hostility to international 
commitments that might lock in a progressive policy agenda.  That is not the end of the story, 
however.  Why, one might ask, did the Truman administration not anticipate this unfavorable 
political dynamic and seek modifications to the UN human rights conventions that would stymie 
the mobilization of oppositional conservative forces?  In other words, why did Truman not attempt 
                                                 
113 Quoted in DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 590 (1948).   
114 “As always,” the Report concluded, “the South can be considered safely Democratic.  And in formulating 
national policy it can be ignored.”  Quoted in id. 592. 
115 See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 43-46 
(2000). 
116 Quoted in Dudziak, supra note 115 at 44.   
117 See DONALDSON, TRUMAN DEFEATS DEWEY, supra note __ at 11-12 (observing that the Republican 
Speaker of the House had told an African American audience that Republican support of fair employment practice 
legislation would alienate Midwest and New England industrialists who would likely stop contributing to the 
Republican Party).  
118 See Whittington, Interpose your Friendly Hand, supra note __ at 592-93. 
119 See CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE PRIZE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN 




to co-opt the political opposition composed of Republicans and Southern Democrats through side-
payments within the framework of these draft UN human rights conventions?  
 
The short answer is that the Truman administration tried but could not get the various 
other state signatories on board.  More specifically, Eleanor Roosevelt, Truman’s chief delegate to 
the United Nations and the first Chair of the UN Human Rights Commission, proposed two 
different modifications to the treaty language that would have made the proposed UN Draft 
Covenant on Human Rights less burdensome to the domestic political opposition.120  First, she 
proposed that the Covenant be non-self-executing and exclude any language on social and 
economic rights.121  Second, she attempted to include a “states rights” provision within the 
Covenant that guaranteed that none of its substantive provisions would apply directly against the 
states (or federal subdivisions).122  The other signatories of the proposed Covenant  rejected it even 
though they were aware that rejection would make it unlikely that the Truman administration 
would gain the legislative support necessary for ratification.123   In sum, the various draft UN 
covenants did not leave any of the domestic opposition in the United States—Republicans and 
Southern Democrats—much reason to believe that they would ever benefit in the future from these 
covenants although they could reasonably expect that their political adversaries would.   
 
Nonetheless, the Bricker Amendment movement still presents a puzzle: Given how 
unfavorable the post-war political climate was to the Senate ratification of human rights treaties, 
why did Senator Bricker and his legislative allies persist in their quest to pass a constitutional 
amendment even after the Republicans won the White House in 1952?  After all, even though 
Eisenhower had disfavored the Bricker amendment as an interference with the executive branch’s 
authority in foreign affairs, he shared his co-partisans’ antipathy to human rights treaties which he 
demonstrated by committing not to negotiate any more such treaties and by appointing a well 
known treaty skeptic to replace Eleanor Roosevelt as delegate to the United Nations.124  One 
plausible answer is that the postwar Republican leadership had succumbed to both isolationalist 
and red scare impulses.125  But this account suffers from one significant weakness.  Although 
Senator Bricker frequently invoked strident nationalist and anticommunist rhetoric, he was hardly 
a diehard isolationist.  Indeed, Bricker had voted for the United States participation in NATO in 
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1949 and for the Marshall plan in 1947.126  Also, a relatively stable bipartisan consensus had 
emerged on foreign policy matters from Roosevelt through the Eisenhower administrations, which 
formed the basis of United States support for post-war multilateral institutions.127  Thus, the 
Bricker Amendment was somewhat of an anomaly; it represented one of very few key foreign 
policy issues in the early 1950s where there was a significant gap between the views of the 
Republicans and Democrat elites.128  
 
 A more promising explanation of the Republican strategy to seek a constitutional 
amendment under Eisenhower’s administration is that they were hoping to achieve two distinct 
but related objectives.  First, they hoped to dissuade federal and state judges who might otherwise 
be sympathetic to progressive causes from relying on the already ratified UN Charter or other 
ratified treaties as a source of binding domestic law.129  Second, they wanted to forestall any future 
progressive administration from achieving its domestic policy objectives through the treaty power.  
Thus, the Bricker Amendment movement represented a concerted campaign by Republican-
leaning business and ideological constituencies (and Southern Democrats) to confine future 
political battles over social and economic policy to venues where they were more likely to prevail 
against their progressive political adversaries.  They attempted to do so by increasing constitutional 
barriers to the President’s authority to make binding treaties with foreign countries, especially if 
there was a risk that such treaties would be self-executing.  
 
The post-war conservative coalition’s view that creating additional veto points over the 
treaty power would hurt the ability of progressives to advance their causes was not without 
foundation.  Given the burgeoning political salience of the civil rights movement and the 
alignment of that movement’s goals with those of labor groups and other New Deal constituencies, 
it was safe to assume that political and judicial efforts pushing for desegregation would be around 
in the future.  Liberal Democrats in the United States and key European allies began to converge 
on core social issues like civil rights and also on an expansive vision of the welfare state.  For 
instance, beyond the Soviet Union’s seemingly self-serving rhetoric condemning racial 
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discrimination in the United States, various democratic European allies criticized the civil rights 
situation in the South.130  Moreover, in post-war Europe, elites sympathized with the notion of 
protecting positive economic rights either through human rights treaties or national 
constitutions.131  In sum, the pool of potential stakeholders in the proposed UN human rights 
agreements was significant and growing, which meant that it might eventually be strong enough in 
the future to weaken the resolve of conservative forces opposed to progressive social and economic 
reform.  
 
In the modern era, the issues surrounding Bricker Amendment continue to play out in 
debates regarding ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the UN 
Convention on Women’s Rights.132  For instance, the 2008 Democratic platform endorsed the 
ratification of both of these covenants as well as the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities.133  By contrast, the 2008 Republican platform vowed to reject these UN human rights 
conventions: “Because the UN has no mandate to promote radical social engineering, any effort to 
address global issues must respect the institutions of marriage and family . . . .  We reject any treaty 
or agreement that would violate those values.  That includes the UN Convention on Women’s 
Rights . . . and the UN Covenant on the Rights of the Child.”134  For Republicans, these treaties 
intruded on two issues that are likely to appeal to that party’s conservative base: family privacy and 
reproductive freedom.  In some sense, opposition to these two UN Conventions accentuates the 
Republican issue ownership over “family values” in a manner that is not only likely to mobilize the 
party’s traditional base,135 but that may also appeal to conservative Democrat voters concerned that 
dominant American cultural values are under attack.136 
   
The institutional terrain for contemporary partisan battles over human rights treaties has 
shifted over the past fifty years.  For instance, partisan interest groups rarely invoke the threat of a 
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constitutional amendment to forestall the ratification of an unfavorable human rights treaty, 
which may lend credence to the criticism that Senator Bricker’s effort to amend the Constitution 
was a form of institutional overkill.137  Instead, modern debates over human treaties tend to center 
around constitutional ambiguities, such as whether such treaties can ever be self-executing,138 or 
whether further legislative action is always required.139  But more broadly, even when human rights 
treaties are ratified by the Senate, they are invariably inundated with reservations that foreclose 
direct enforcement of such treaties in domestic courts.140  At bottom, partisan groups on both sides 
of the issue very likely emerged from the Bricker Amendment controversy more circumspect about 
how to use institutional arrangements and legislation to advance their respective agendas.  For 
instance, progressives probably realized that a friendly federal judiciary interpreting a robust vision 
of the Fourteenth Amendment was a better vehicle for entrenching domestic civil rights policy 
goals than UN international human rights agreements.141  On the other hand, right-leaning groups 
realized that they could effectively thwart the domestic enforcement of unfavorable human rights 
agreements without having to resort to proposals to amend the Constitution. 
 
In sum, although debates regarding human rights treaties and norms are often couched in 
high-minded or principled language, they often implicate more strategic partisan and electoral 
calculations.  With respect to the post-war human rights treaty controversies, advocacy groups 
associated with both of the major political parties were seeking to expand or shrink the scope of 
political conflict over social and economic policy to venues in which they have an advantage.  
Then, as now, these debates were often not over competing visions of American foreign policy, but 
over the role such human rights treaties should play in increasingly polarizing domestic conflicts 
over cultural and social policy issues.142 
 
At bottom, human and social rights treaties may tend to influence the electoral opportunity 
structure in ways that favor one party over another.  First, human rights policies might appeal 
directly to the needs of electorally relevant constituencies in one party.   When Truman first 
                                                 
137 See John B. Whitton and J Edward Fowler, Bricker Amendment—Fallacies and Dangers, 48 AM J. INTL L 23, 
23-24 (1954). 
138 As discussed earlier, despite the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncement in Medellin, the contours of the 
doctrine governing self-executing treaties still remain unclear.  See discussion in text at supra note __.  
139 See Henkin, The Ghost of Senator Bricker, supra note __ at 341-43; David Sloss, The Domestication of 
International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129, 139-42 
(1999) (observing that the United States included declarations of non-self-execution in its instruments of ratification 
with respect to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment). 
140 See Henkin, supra note __ at 341-43.   For some of the debates regarding reservations to human rights 
treaties and their validity, see Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State Consent, 96 AM. J. 
INT'L L 531 (2002) (suggesting that reservations should be treated as severable); but cf Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. 
Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 PA. L. REV.399, 402 (2000) (arguing that reservations 
to human rights treaties “reflect a sensible accommodation of competing domestic and international considerations.”).  
141 See Whittington, supra note __ at 591-93.  
142 See Curtis Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 402-03 (1998-99) 
(discussing how the proliferation of human rights treaties might affect state control over social issues); Moravscik, The 




succeeded Franklin Roosevelt, he might not have inherited a mandate to promote civil rights; by 
the end of his first term, though, he was facing mounting pressure by a well-organized African 
American constituency to take a more aggressive stance on desegregation.  Championing the 
progressive social policy goals contained in the various UN human rights agreements promised to 
solidify the support of a group that proved to be important to his electoral success in the 1948 
presidential elections and to whom he would undoubtedly turn for support in 1952.  On the other 
hand, Truman’s stance alienated the Southern Democrats who subsequently became vital allies in 
a Republican-led backlash against the UN human rights movement.   
 
Second, human rights issues might tend to raise the profile of issues owned by one party.   In 
the United States, most of the issues covered by UN human rights treaties tend to be those in 
which Democrats are likely to have an electoral advantage, such as discrimination towards women 
and minority groups, rights of immigrants and refugees, and rights of criminal suspects.  
Alternatively, these treaties  tend to ignore or deemphasize issues on which Republicans have an 
electoral advantage over Democrats.  For example, one commentator has suggested that Americans 
and Europeans are “farther divided on the question of capital punishment than on any other 
morally significant issue of government policy.”143  Ostensibly, the European Union insists that 
capital punishment offends “human dignity” and that its abolition will lead to “the progressive 
development of human rights.”144  But such rhetoric obscures the reality that capital punishment 
has been a part of the  electoral strategy of the Republican Party in the United States for the past 
four decades and its abolition would very like undermine the office-holding objectives of that 
party.145  The redistributive politics of capital punishment stem not only from the reality that core 
Republican constituencies tend to favor harsher criminal punishment, but also because 
independents and swing voters tend to trust Republican candidates to be tougher on crime than 
their Democrat counterparts.146  Republicans since the Nixon administration have deliberately 
cultivated an anti-crime image of which unwavering partisan support for capital punishment has 
been a key component.147  To a significant degree, this strategy has worked.  According to some 
empirical studies, there is a strong positive relationship between Republican Party strength and the 
legal existence of the death penalty.148  Meanwhile, crime has continued to be one of the most 
electorally salient issues in American politics.  As one commentator has observed, “it would not be 
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hyperbolic to conclude that crime has been the central theme in the rhetoric of American electoral 
politics and in the strategies of elected officials in the decades since 1968.”149    
 
Given these political dynamics, it is unsurprising that no modern human rights treaty has ever 
been ratified while Republicans held a majority in the United States Senate; indeed, as Moravcsik 
has observed, such treaties have only been ratified when the Democrats have held close to a super-
majority in the Senate.150  
  
b. Promoting Intra-Partisan Conflict within the Political Opposition: The Case of NAFTA   
 
At first blush, the passage of NAFTA in 1993 might seem like an odd illustration of how 
political parties use international law to secure electoral or ideological advantage.  After all, the 
prevailing account of international trade in the United States is one of well-organized and 
concentrated interest groups who exercise significant lobbying clout over a Congress that is 
increasingly wedded to “special interests.”151  Downplaying any significant role for partisanship, 
this account suggests that protectionist groups deployed their privileged access to key congressional 
committees in the early part of the twentieth century to seek policies that raised trade barriers to 
dangerously high levels.  This strong pork barrel dynamic, the story goes, eventually triggered the 
disastrous Smoot-Hawley Tariff legislation of the 1930s, which in turn propelled Congress in 1934 
to take measures to delegate much of its international trade authority to the President.152  By 
turning over more power to a free-trade-oriented executive branch that was more accountable to a 
broader audience, Congress was able to forestall an increasing spiral of protectionism and set the 
stage for modern era of free trade.153  According to this account, the passage of NAFTA, like 
previous international trade agreements of the twentieth century, was simply another incident 
where a combination of institutional factors and favorable historical circumstances led to a 
triumph of public-regarding policies over special interest politics.154 
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But recent scholarship has begun to question this long-standing institutionalist narrative.  
First, as a growing number of studies have shown, the notion that the President is consistently 
more free trade oriented than Congress is suspect.  On the contrary, trade policies often seem to 
track partisan lines, rather than the institutional preferences of the political branches.  For 
instance, prior to the 1950s, Republican politicians across both political branches favored more 
protectionist policies than Democrats,155 whereas in the modern era, the parties have largely 
switched positions, with the Republicans becoming more the party of free trade.156  Moreover, the 
broader claim that the President may be more responsive to a much more nationalist constituency 
(and thus fewer protectionists) than Congress is both under-theorized and lacks empirical 
support.157  Second, the notion that Congress would attempt to restrict interest group pressures by 
delegating international trade authority to the President also seems difficult to reconcile with what 
we know about legislative behavior.  After all, Congress has not forsaken involvement in 
international trade politics; indeed, interest group lobbying before Congress on trade issues is still 
quite common.158  More broadly, if Congress were seeking to protect itself from the effect of 
special interest politics, why would it restrict its public-mindedness to international trade and not 
extend it to other areas where special interest lobbying is pervasive, such as tort reform, gun 
control, or health care reform?  Third, the notion that international trade politics in Congress are 
best characterized as one-sided pork barrel lobbying in favor of higher trade barriers is misleading; 
on the contrary, there are well-organized interest groups both in favor and against reducing trade 
barriers and the evidence does not suggest that protectionist groups are consistently more 
influential than export-oriented industry groups seeking to lower trade barriers.159  
 
In any event, a cursory review of the political dynamics preceding the passage of NAFTA in 
1993 suggests that the quest for partisan advantage played a key role.   For Democrats seeking to 
take back the White House in 1992, NAFTA exposed a potentially significant fault line within 
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their core electoral coalition, dividing party centrists such as the moderate and business-oriented 
Democrat Leadership Council (DLC) from the more traditional Democratic labor 
constituencies.160  To Clinton, a self-styled New Democrat who was himself a leader of the DLC, 
the question of a North American regional trade agreement that would include Mexico was 
potentially a highly divisive issue that threatened to undermine the unity of the coalition he 
needed to gain victory in 1992.  As James Shoch shows in his extensive study of post-war United 
States trade policy, the fight against NAFTA was the most significant lobbying effort undertaken 
by organized labor since the 1930s; for the most part, organized labor feared that the agreement 
would precipitate significant capital flight to Mexico and depress blue collar wages.161  Thus, unlike 
the politics surrounding the negotiation of the Uruguay Round in 1994, which did not provoke 
significant resistance by labor groups in the United States, NAFTA involved the broad 
liberalization of investment flows.  On the other hand, however, centrist Democrats were courting 
American multinational companies that were hoping to use the agreement to take advantage of 
Mexico’s vast labor pool.162  Faced with the possibility of a deeply divided coalition within the 
Democratic Party, Clinton had an incentive to avoid taking any clear sides during his campaign on 
an issue that was likely to polarize his base.163   
 
Against this background, Republicans had an incentive to lift NAFTA high on the 1992 
campaign agenda, partly to exploit any resultant infighting among Democrats to their electoral 
advantage.  Initially, the Republicans had made the negotiation of NAFTA a key part of their 
electoral platform, hoping that focusing on its implications would shore up their support among 
Hispanic voters and business groups in Southwest states that might prove to be pivotal in a close 
election.164  More importantly, however, the Republicans started to realize that international trade 
would be a wedge issue for the Democrats that year.165  After all, the Democratic primaries had 
revealed very strong cleavages between two different coalitions in the party, one which was 
personified by the stridently anti-NAFTA position of Senator Larkin of Iowa and the other by the 
more moderate and business-friendly Clinton.166  Later that fall, President Bush turned up the heat 
and accused his opponent Clinton of waffling on international trade;167 indeed, Clinton’s 
ambivalence over NAFTA became a key talking point for the Republicans as to why the 
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Democratic candidate could not be trusted as a decisive leader.168  Initially, it looked like the 
Republican divide-and-rule strategy was working as Clinton refused to take a clear position on the 
issue throughout the summer.169   He eventually relented and said he would accept the signed 
NAFTA agreement a month before the election, but only if the final agreement included side 
agreements on labor standards.170   
 
So why did the Republicans push so hard to make NAFTA a significant part of the agenda in 
an election year?  In the end, it is difficult to conclude that NAFTA was obviously an issue in 
which Republicans believed that they could pick up many swing voters at the expense of 
Democrats, since the passage of NAFTA was hardly a popular issue in the economic climate of late 
1992.171  Moreover, it is not clear that the Republicans thought they could even prevail on the 
NAFTA question had they won the 1992 presidential election since it was unlikely that would pick 
up enough votes from House Democrats to ensure ratification.172  More plausibly, the Republicans 
recognized the political value of using NAFTA to exploit cleavages within the Democratic Party 
which they believed could make it difficult for Democrats to turn out their trade union base that 
November.   
 
By the time Clinton took the oath of office in early 1993, the question of NAFTA ratification 
had already been foisted squarely unto the legislative agenda.  Since President Bush had already 
signed the treaty in December 1992, ignoring the issue was no longer an option for Clinton.  He 
had to make a choice either way, and each possible course of action was fraught with the risk of 
alienating a significant part of his party’s base.  Nonetheless, Clinton decided to stake much of his 
political capital in favor of ratification and was personally involved in trying to usher the pact 
through Congress.173  But it is probably an exaggeration to attribute Clinton’s decision to back 
NAFTA largely to institutional factors, such as the differences of constituencies faced by presidents 
and members of Congress.  In the end, Clinton was already a member of the business-oriented 
coalition within the Democratic Party before his campaign for the presidency, and his preferences 
on international trade mirrored those preferred by that coalition.  To placate the concerns of the 
more dominant anti-NAFTA coalition within his own party, however, he worked through the 
spring of 1993 to include side agreements that would establish commissions authorized to 
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investigate and enforce violations of environmental and labor standards.174  But a sufficient 
number of pro-NAFTA Republican Senators were intensely opposed to these side agreements and 
threatened to withhold their support if they were part of the package.175  Caught between a rock 
and hard place, the Clinton administration agreed to water down the power of these proposed 
commissions to only inquire and study alleged violations, without providing them with any real 
enforcement authority.  That compromise was not enough to satisfy most of the key labor groups, 
however, and they mounted an intense lobbying campaign against ratification.176  But despite their 
opposition, Clinton was able to pick up enough wavering Democrats to ensure the bill’s passage.177  
 
Ultimately, however, NAFTA ratification was the product of a largely skewed partisan vote in 
Congress, with a significant majority of Republicans (75 percent) voting in favor and with 60 
percent of Democrats against,178 despite Clinton’s Democratic leadership from the White House.  
In many respects, the NAFTA vote seemed to vindicate a traditional parties-as-agent account, with 
Republicans being more responsive to internationally oriented business groups seeking market 
access, while Democrats were much more responsive to labor interests such as the AFL-CIO.  In 
addition, some Democrats probably jumped ship on NAFTA to avoid handing President Clinton 
an embarrassing defeat on one of his key legislative initiatives, but these same Democrats might 
have been less sanguine about supporting NAFTA had it been pushed by a Republican 
President.179  
   
Reeling from their defeat in NAFTA, both the pro-labor liberal wing of the Democratic Party 
and their organized labor constituencies were much better prepared to block the passage of future 
regional trade agreements during the rest of Clinton’s administration.  For instance, the AFL-CIO 
proved to be much more influential in thwarting Clinton’s efforts to seek fast-track authority in 
1997, with 79 percent of House Democrats opposing an extension of negotiation authority.180  
Furthermore, labor groups affiliated with the Democratic Party scored another decisive victory 
against the expansion of NAFTA in 1998.  This time, however, it was the House Republican 
leadership that took the initiative to introduce fast-track authority legislation for President 
Clinton, probably hoping to provoke a division between the House Democrats and the White 
House during the mid-term elections that year.181  Again, despite a bill that would ostensibly give 
the Democrat Clinton more authority in international affairs, opposition by House Democrats was 
                                                 
174  See id. at 175-76.  
175 See SHOCH, TRADING BLOWS, supra note __ at 176-77. 
176 See id at 176. 
177 See id. at 283-85. 
178 The vote breakdown along partisan lines was 132-43 Republicans in favor, while Democrats were against it 
102-156.  See SHOCH, TRADING BLOWS, supra note __ at 183-84.  
179 See SHOCH, TRADING BLOWS, supre note __ at 185. 
180 See James Shoch, Contesting Globalization: Organized Labor, NAFTA, and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fights, 
28 Pol. & Soc’y 119, 127, 130 (2000).    For clarification, fast track procedures refer to when Congress provides 
advance authorization to the President to negotiate trade agreements with other countries which the President will 
then submit to Congress for approval and implementation. Under such procedures, the President is then assured of 
an up or down vote on the implementing legislation that he submits to Congress.  For a quick overview of the legal 
and historical origins of the fast track procedure see Steve Charnovitz, Book Review, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L. 153 (2007) 
(reviewing HAL S. SHAPIRO, FAST TRACK:  A LEGAL, HISTORICAL, AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (2006)). 




both broad and intense with only 15% of Democrats voting in support of the measure.182  In both 
of these cases, a significant majority of House Republicans proved to be eager to lend their support 
to Clinton,183 presumably because they believed that fast-track authority would advance the cause 
of their favored constituencies and hurt the cause of Democratic-leaning labor constituencies, even 
if the individual occupying the White House belonged to the political opposition.    
 
The politics of intra-coalitional conflict might shed some light on why Democrats in Congress 
were able to forestall new fast-track legislation that would expand NAFTA, but have been less 
successful in repealing or renegotiating NAFTA since then.  To put it bluntly, regardless of the 
party in the White House, the existence of significant Democratic legislative majorities might make 
it harder for new regional trade agreements to pass because the median House Democrat still 
appears to be unwilling to ignore the preferences of the party’s core labor constituencies.184      -But 
once such regional international trade agreements pass, Democrats might not necessarily seek to 
repeal them.  One explanation might be that while parties have an incentive not to push policies 
that are likely to alienate their core supporters, they also have an incentive to avoid pushing a 
policy agenda that is likely to trigger significant intra-partisan conflict.  Even if a Democratic 
congressional majority were able to muster enough numbers in the House to repeal or renegotiate 
NAFTA, such an effort would likely set off an intense battle between Democratic centrists and 
trade unionists and thus undermine the party’s effort to win office and push its policy agenda.  In 
this picture, removing the repeal of NAFTA from the legislative agenda could help both 
Democratic presidents and party leaders in Congress manage their party’s diverse coalitions 
without sacrificing their ability to push other policy goals in which there might be broader intra-
partisan agreement (or less intense disagreement), such as health care or financial service reform.185  
Perhaps concerns about intra-partisan conflict might explain why criticism of NAFTA was popular 
among Democratic presidential candidates campaigning in the rustbelt during the 2008 primary 
election season,186 but the issue of repealing or renegotiating NAFTA quietly receded into the 
background once President Obama entered the White House in 2009. 
 
In the end, the ratification of NAFTA presented the prospect of cross-coalitional bargaining 
opportunities where pro-business Democratic leaders could join forces with Republicans to 
support an agreement that entrenched their preferences at the expense of pro-labor Democrats 
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who nonetheless represented a bigger and stronger coalition within the Democratic Party.  But is it 
precisely this cross-coalitional dynamic that makes agreements like NAFTA politically sustainable 
across multiple electoral periods.  The flipside is that one cannot presume that regional trade 
agreements like NAFTA will continue to withstand repeal simply because such agreements provide 
substantial benefits to powerful export-oriented industry groups, especially if such groups cease to 
play a key role in the intra-coalitional politics of the Democratic Party.  Take, for instance, a 
scenario where a majority of the pro-business Democrats in Congress lose their seats in a specific 
election cycle and are replaced by liberal pro-labor Democrats or conservative Republicans.187  In 
such a scenario where significant intra-partisan conflict can be avoided, a Democratic 
administration under united government may very well consider repealing, or at least renegotiating 




 *       *        *  
 
To summarize, opportunities for cross-partisan bargaining might help explain the different 
political trajectories in the United States of the post-war human rights treaties and the passage of 
NAFTA in 1993. Both kinds of international agreements were plagued by distributive partisan 
conflicts, which tracked the divergent preferences of interest groups associated with both of the 
major political parties.  In the first case, however, the absence of cross-partisan policy bundling 
opportunities between Republican- and Democratic-leaning interest groups not only thwarted the 
possibility of the ratification of the post-war human rights treaties, but also provoked a 
constitutional amendment by conservatives who viewed these post-war treaties as vehicles that 
would provide one-sided benefits to progressive constituencies.  By contrast, in the case of 
international trade, the presence of a cross-partisan coalition, uniting the pro-business wing of the 
Democratic Party and traditional free-market Republicans made NAFTA electorally sustainable, 
even though it was disfavored by a majority of congressional Democrats and their labor-oriented 
constituents.  
  
V. CONCLUSION AND SOME POLICY AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS 
 
A growing number of studies have suggested that domestic factors influence the preferences of 
states for international cooperation.189 This Essay has extended that literature by exploring the role 
of partisanship in framing domestic support and opposition to specific international legal 
commitments.  Specifically, it suggests that if certain conditions hold, international law can 
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sometimes be used as a vehicle for advancing the partisan objectives of an incumbent government.  
Alternatively, international legal commitments can be used to impose differential constraints on 
the ability of parties to campaign on (and carry out) their most favored issues and projects.  By 
illuminating the processes underlying the choice of partisan preference for international legal 
commitments, this insight questions the conventional wisdom that partisan politics stop at the 
water’s edge.  And while this Essay does not purport to systematically evaluate these claims against 
the evidence, the logic of the argument is sufficiently plausible and the case studies sufficiently 
diffuse to make it clear that the partisan calculus will sometimes play a key role in the choice of 
international legal commitments. 
 
This analysis has broader implications for our understanding of the efficacy of international 
legal regimes.  By demonstrating the importance of partisan politics in the actual choice of 
international legal commitments, this analysis also suggests that whether future or existing 
international legal regimes will actually work as intended may often depend on whether these 
regimes are congruent with the preferences of a cross-partisan coalition of domestic actors.  The 
question of efficacy is especially pronounced where domestic actors play a significant role in either 
implementing or enforcing international legal commitments.  Thus, for instance, to understand 
whether the United States (or some other country) will comply effectively with a future global 
climate change regime, we should not simply focus on distributive disputes that occur at the 
interstate level, but also at the intra-state level among competing political factions from both major 
political parties.  Moreover, in other contexts where electorally based incentives to renege on an 
international commitment tracks partisan preferences, we should be concerned as to whether 
reputation or other external enforcement options may be sufficient to induce compliance.  
 
This Essay does not stake out a position on whether this partisan connection to international 
legal commitments is normatively problematic.   Nonetheless, it seems that we can identify, in an 
admittedly crude way, some grounds for concern.  As international legal and regulatory regimes 
continue to proliferate and touch on sensitive political issues like social rights and capital 
punishment, it may be inevitable that the distributive consequences of these regimes will have 
significant effects on domestic politics.  But one may nonetheless hope that international legal 
regimes can be politically sustainable and palatable to domestic audiences in ways that classic 
power politics arrangements are not.  Differential partisan constraints and opportunities across 
various international regimes, however, may upset these expectations.  Viewed this way, the 
partisan dynamics underlying international legal commitments can be harmful.  In the domestic 
context, John Ferejohn has pointed out some obvious problems that arise when legal regimes and 
courts become intensely politicized: “It has the effect of . . . making judicial decisions appear to be 
politically motivated and . . . of reducing the legitimate abilities of the people and their 
representatives to legislate, and, less often, of provoking crude and heavy-handed electoral 
responses.”190    
 
But beyond those concerns, there is the additional problem that international law partisanship 
can be a two-way street.  Just as one party may sometimes seek to use international law to advance 
its narrow partisan preferences, another party may also seek to block the adoption of an 
                                                 




international legal commitment that happens to provide distributive benefits to its political 
adversary, even if the commitment ostensibly resolves some genuine global cooperation or 
coordination problem.  In this picture, the real casualty will likely be the efficacy of international 
law as a binding constraint on the behavior of national states.  Perhaps a plausible institutional 
path towards de-politicization may be to make sure that international legal commitments enjoy the 
support of legislative supermajorities; ironically, such an institutional approach—although 
increasingly criticized and sidestepped in the modern era191—already exists in the United States.  It 
is found in the Treaty power requirement that two-thirds of the Senate has to approve an 
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